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The Journal of American History December 1995 that resulted in cancellation of the exhibition. The first story traces planning for the exhibition in a museum whose staff was increasingly determined to apply professional, scholarly standards in a previously celebratory institution. The second concerns the uneasy relationship between the museum and many in the military aviation community. The third, of course, tells of the larger culture wars and the reaction of the museum to its critics. The fourth and fifth concern the appointment of a new secretary of the Smithsonian Institution just when political power in Congress shifted, for the first time in almost two generations, from Democrats to Republicans. Although what follows treats some of the stories at greater length than others, each was crucial to the character and timing of the outcome.
The first and most basic ingredient was the exhibition script itself, a product of the National Air and Space Museum and its history over the last twenty years. Since its opening in the mid-1970s, Air and Space had gained a worldwide reputation for breathtaking artifacts, huge and laudatory crowds of visitors (the highest numbers in the world, as many as 10 million in some years), but little intellectual or scholarly content. Indeed, Congress appropriated money to construct the building on the Mall largely on the promise of what the historian Alex Roland has called "good, old-fashioned celebration of American achievement . . . enshrinement, pure and simple." Five years after the building opened, an observer characterized the museum as "largely a giant advertisement for air and space technology." Air and Space was criticized for memorializing individual inventive genius and the corporations that create the machines, "equat[ing] technological advance with social progress," and "desir[ing] to promote aerospace activities"-all of which cost it respect in the Smithsonian community. When, in the mid-1980s, Air and Space's director was forced out, the criticism of his leadership included charges of hostility to historians and to analytical scholarship. Even the museum's displays and exhibits seemed to command less respect among aerospace museum professionals than did the size and comprehensiveness of its collection of air-and spacecraft and associated artifacts. "Give me that collection and a building on the Mall and I could have ten million visitors easy," the chief curator of another museum told me in the late 1980s. 3 The appointment in 1987 of Martin Harwit, a respected astrophysicist from Cornell University with a longstanding interest in the history of science, seemed to promise a solution to many of the problems. The first academic and scholar to head the museum (his predecessors had been scientists, engineers, or aviators), Harwit was selected by Robert McCormick Adams, secretary of the Smithsonian from 1984 to 1994. Very much an academic, Adams eschewed such Washington power folkways as dark suits and the trappings of office. He managed the institu-I Alex Roland, "Celebration or Education? The Goals of the U.S. National Air and Space Museum," History and Technology, 10 (nos. 1-2, 1993), 86; Joseph J. Corn, "Tools, Technologies, and Contexts: Interpreting the History of American Technics," in History Museums in the United States: A Critical Assessment, ed. Warren Leon and Roy Rosenzweig (Urbana, 1989) , 241-44. tion in a style that Smithsonian insiders characterized as "laissez-faire in a funny way . . . like academia," "collegial," and an effort "to stimulate more independence." But his management was also criticized, from within and without. Adams's priority was research. He aimed to put the institution on the cutting edge of scholarship, or at least to modernize exhibits and programs where the institution had fallen behind-in Adams's words, "deepening the intellectual structure of the place." Adams aimed to encourage critical scholarship in an institution whose reputation for scholarly leadership had waned as its reputation for uninspired establishmentarianism flourished. One role of the Smithsonian, as Adams saw it, was to "put on exhibits that make people uncomfortable," so it was no accident that the four Smithsonian exhibits most criticized in recent years for "counterculture" "political correctness" -"The West As America," "A More Perfect Union," "Science in American Life," and the planned Enola Gay exhibition-were developed during his tenure. Adams showed little respect for military history, at least as he saw it practiced. He allowed the Eisenhower Institute to fold by not replacing its director, Forrest Pogue, when he retired. In 1987 Adams told a reporter, "We have lots of artifacts, but [military history is] a field that involves strategy, human suffering. . Somehow we haven't picked that up and run with it. That's an opportunity, among many, which we ought to seize." "Take the Air and Space Museum," he said. "What are the responsibilities of a museum to deal with the destruction caused by air power?"4 Martin Harwit, whom Adams chose over a distinguished retired four-star United States Air Force general with a graduate history degree, embraced Adams's agenda of scholarship and apparently shared his views of military affairs and air power. Harwit set out to encourage the curators to extend their historical research and writings, to hire bright young scholars, to help staff members finish graduate degrees, to increase the intellectual content of displays and exhibitions, and to foster scientific as well as historical study, but not to lessen either the appeal of the museum or its service to public, professional, industrial, and military constituencies. He even confronted two nagging problems of long standing: conservation of precious but deteriorating artifacts and the size of the collection, which had been built by the legendary chief curator Paul Garber, who for over fifty years had collected anything valuable, whether or not the Smithsonian had the storage space or the resources to care for the object. Patient and consultative, open to ideas, considerate of staff while insisting on high standards, Harwit made many difficult choices. Although he did not please everyone or solve every problem, under his constant and consistent prodding, the museum made steady progress. By the early 1990s, Air and Space had progressed to a standard of excellence that its position of leadership -conferred by its location in Washington, its place within Smithsonian, and the size and scope of its collection-required.5
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The Enola Gay exhibition would advance Harwit's agenda of promoting scholarship, exploring the social contexts and human implications of the aviation and space experiences, and avoiding uncritical celebration of technology. Restoration of the famous airplane began under his predecessor. From the outset the museum staff recognized how controversial the airplane would be, even if it were displayed with only an identifying label. For years, veterans had badgered the museum to restore the Enola Gay and display it or to loan or transfer it to a site or institution where it would receive the honor its historic flight deserved. During the 1980s, the NASM's Research Advisory Committee several times debated whether the aircraft should be restored and displayed. Members of the committee favored restoration and exhibition because of the plane's educational value in an exhibition. The only dissenter was the outspokenly antinuclear retired admiral and former commander of United States armed forces in the Pacific, Noel Gayler, who argued forcefully against any act that could be interpreted to celebrate such destruction or to memorialize the killing of so many innocent civilians. Thus well before the museum began mounting an exhibition, even before it began the expensive restoration of the aircraft, the Hiroshima atomic bomber had already come to symbolize both conflicting perspectives on American war making -emphasizing either innovative technological achievement or the mass death of enemy civilians-and, more widely, positive and negative judgments on the American past. The airplane had become, and within the museum was understood to have become, a flash point of profound, often emotional disagreement about how to observe, or even whether to observe, the event that had made this most famous of military aircraft significant. When, in 1989 and 1990 , in preparation for the exhibit, the museum undertook a sixteen-month program of lectures, films, panel discussions, and scholarly symposia about strategic bombing, argument was often intense. Disagreement broke out in the planning committee over whom to invite to participate. During the events, participants and people in the audience disagreed among themselves, often radically, particularly over the motives for, and the effects of, the bombing campaigns during World War II and over the use of nuclear weapons both in 1945 and, during the Cold War, for deterrence.6 beginning in the early 1980s, and service on three NASM advisory committees: special advisory committee on research, 1986; Collections Management Advisory Committee, 1988 -1991 and Advisory Committee on Research and Collections Management, 1991-present, as chair . My views are supported in part by "Statement by I. Michael Heyman, Secretary Smithsonian Institution," May 2, 1995 (in Kohn's possession). In my judgment, Harwit's direction of NASM was designed to conform its activities to the understanding of the role of the Smithsonian first articulated in the Smithsonian's first circular: not merely to entertain and amuse the public or to inspire them and celebrate national achievements, but to educate and to advance the frontiers of knowledge. See G. Brown Goode, Plan of Organization and Regulations (Washington, 1881), cited in G. Carroll Lindsay, "George Brown Goode," in Keepers of the Past, ed. Clifford L. Lord (Chapel Hill, 1965), 132-33, 137 . Compare Goode's ideas with those that inspired NASM, according to Roland, "Celebration or Education?," 77-89. 6 As chief of air force history at the time and at my own request, I advised the planning committee and attended many of the events. I recognized the air force's interest in, and sensitivity to, public interpretations of military aviation history and strategic bombing, especially involving atomic and nuclear weapons. My purpose was to encourage the museum to present a broad range of the best scholarly interpretations and the voices of the most knowledgeable and thoughtful participants, to avoid moralizing or politically inspired perspectives that were not based on solid research or high-quality analysis, and to position the museum "above the battle" of conflicting interpretations about strategic bombing and the use of the atomic bombs in 1945. The original In keeping with the goals of scholarship and education and in spite of the conflict any exhibition was sure to provoke, the museum embedded in the exhibit a didactic objective that exacerbated the potential for controversy. According to the 1993 planning document, the exhibition's "primary goal" was "to encourage visitors to make a thoughtful and balanced re-examination of the atomic bombings in the light of the political and military factors leading to the decision to use the bomb, the human suffering experienced by the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the long-term implications of the events of August 6 and 9, 1945." In other words, the chief purpose was not simply to present a historical investigation of what happened, why, and what it meant, but to revisit the American decision to use the bomb in 1945, to ask whether the bomb was needed or justified, and to suggest "an uncertain, potentially dangerous future for all of civilization." "The exhibition would conclude, as it began, by noting the debatable character of the atomic bombings," read an earlier document. Secretary Adams expressed worry about the contentious nature of the proposal. In response, the chairman of the Aeronautics Department, Tom Crouch, who would oversee production of the exhibit script, told Harwit: "Do you want to do an exhibition intended to make veterans feel good, or do you want an exhibition that will lead our visitors to think about the consequences of the atomic Bombing of Japan? Frankly, I don't think we can do both."7 From the beginning, then, the Enola Gay exhibit was designed to provoke its audience; and in the mind of the chief supervising curator, the museum faced an unbridgeable chasm between scholarship and commemoration. Harwit insisted that the museum could do both, impartially and responsibly, and he suggested that Crouch and Michael Neufeld, the lead curator, could withdraw if work on the exhibit would violate their professional ethics. Both agreed that it would not, and they continued.8 slate of speakers was in my (and others') opinion heavily tilted toward criticism of strategic bombing, the development and use of atomic weapons, and the meaning and impact of the nuclear age, and it did not include the most knowledgeable veterans or those scholars most current in researching the field. The museum rectified this bias in the program and participants. Harwit made clear that the program should introduce museum staff to the best scholarship and most knowledgeable veterans in preparation for the Enola Gay exhibit.
I National Air and Space Museum, "Exhibition Planning DocumentJuly 1993. Harwit, July 17, 1993, ibid. ; Adams said he found much of the planning document "compelling. There could be an exhibit here that would do the Smithsonian credit. On the other hand, there are some, fairly fundamental aspects of it with which I am no more in agreement now than when we have discussed them on previous occasions." Adams listed seven points, asked for changes, and clearly expressed his unease about aspects of the interpretation, at one point using the term "increasing the risk to SI." Crouch warned Harwit about tampering with the exhibit piecemeal to meet Adams's objections: "What we will accomplish is to transform a good, powerful, and honest exhibition into a mass of confused messages on the basis of ten million nickel-and-dime changes. April 20, 1995, p. A7; Philadelphia Inquirer, April 20, 1995, p. A7; ibid., April 24, 1995, p. D1. 
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The first script, finished in January 1994, titled the exhibition "The Crossroads: The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb, and the Origins of the Cold War"; it combined patriotic commemoration with serious scholarship. The 303 pages of text, comprising narrative explanation and labels to connect and identify dozens of photographs, paintings, maps, charts, documents, videos, and artifacts, including the fuselage of the Enola Gay, was a sophisticated historical collage. The exhibition told the story with a clarity and completeness designed to appeal to varied audiences, while compromising none of the complexity. The first of five sections set the scene by describing the war in the Pacific during 1945, focusing on the mounting casualties in the island campaigns, the strategic bombing of Japan, and the two home fronts at war. The second investigated the decision to drop the bomb, beginning with the Manhattan Project and ending with an exegesis of the factors that influenced President Harry S. Truman and his senior advisers. The third and longest (92 pages) recounted the history of the B-29, its use against Japan in 1945, the formation and training of the 509th Composite Group (which dropped the bombs), the history of the Enola Gay airplane, and the details of the two missions on August 6 and 9, 1945. The fourth described the effect of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, emphasizing the human suffering. The fifth, the shortest and most superficial, devoted 10 pages to Japan's decision to surrender and 14 to the Cold War and the nuclear arms race.9
The story was told in context, frequently with rich detail. The themes of risk, bravery, and struggles to overcome unprecedented technical and operational problems underlay the third section. The script thus celebrated American ingenuity and technical prowess. The two longest subsections in the exhibition script, nearly 20 percent of the entire text, reconstructed with respect and sensitivity the experiences of the Enola Gay's aviators: their selection, training, life in the States and in the Pacific, and challenges in flying the two missions. The museum consulted and worked with veterans, and it arranged for loans of documents and artifacts, most notably from museums in Japan.
In presenting historical interpretations, the texts were cautious and balanced, choosing words precisely so as to treat controversial subjects with a tone of distance and detachment. On the cause of the war, the script said, "Japanese expansionism was marked by naked aggression and extreme brutality. The slaughter of tens of thousand of Chinese in Nanking in 1937 shocked the world. Atrocities byJapanese troops included brutal mistreatment of civilians, forced laborers and prisoners of war, and biological experiments on human victims." On the decision to use the bomb, the script portrayed the president rather sympathetically. Times, Feb. 5, 1995, p. ES; and below, 1050 and 1051. that had always aimed at producing a military weapon. Furthermore he was faced with the prospect of an invasion and he was told that the bomb would be useful for impressing the Soviet Union. He therefore saw no reason to avoid using the bomb. Alternatives for ending the Pacific war other than an invasion or atomic-bombing were available, but are more obvious in hindsight that [sic] they were at the time.
Churchill observed that "Truman and his advisers could not know how the war would actually end." On projected American casualties in the planned invasion of Japan, perhaps the greatest bone of contention between the museum and its critics, the original script was fair. "To many on the Allied side, the suicidal resistance of the Japanese military justified the harshest possible measures. The appalling casualties suffered by both sides seemed to foreshadow what could be expected during an invasion ofJapan. Allied victory was assured, but its final cost in lives remained disturbingly uncertain." On Japanese resistance to surrender, the script characterized the Japanese government as "dominated" by "hawkish Army generals" and "die-hard military leaders who wished to fight a last battle in Japan." The Japanese peace feeler in the spring of 1945 was therefore "weak and indecisive." "As a result, opportunities to end the war early were greatly limited." An Exhibit Advisory Committee of ten scholars from the government, academe, and the literary community convened by the museum to critique this first script praised the curators for a "sound" approach and "a careful and professional job," which required only "a little refining"; individual committee members disagreed with parts of the script but, according to one participant, "these concerns were a matter of emphasis." All agreed that the exhibit "would inform, challenge and commemorate" and was "solid and . . . rooted in the latest historical scholarship." 10 What most bothered the critics, including some historians, and led to the public campaign of opposition by the Air Force Association, other veterans' groups, politicians, and commentators were not the carefully crafted statements of interpretation, virtually all of which were consensus scholarship. (A very few statements, mostly taken out of context, were used publicly to accuse the museum of an anti-American and pro-Japanese portrayal.)" The problems with the script were the omission of material, the emphasis on other material, the order and placement of facts and analysis, and the tone and the mood. Taken as a whole and read with the emotional impact on viewers in mind, the exhibition was in fact unbalanced; it possessed a very clear and potent point of view. On a level of feeling that could '1 National Air and Space Museum, "Crossroads," 100, p. 5. (Each part of this draft script bears a number in the hundreds and is separately paginated, so 100, p. 5, is page 5 of part 1.) Ibid., 200, pp. 1, 56; 100, p. 6. See also ibid., 16, 23, and 54. Ibid., 200, pp. 25, 26 ; Stanley Goldberg, "Smithsonian Suffers Legionnaire's Disease," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 51 (May/June 1995), 30. Cf. Wallace, "Battle of the Enola Gay," 2-5.
" Mike Wallace points out that most "of the pundits . . . relied on a series of articles by John T. Correll, editor of Air Force Magazine," a judgment that confirms my own reading of columns and press reports. See Wallace, "Battle of the Enola Gay," 2. For a glaring example, see "The Shame of Enola Gay," Popular Mechanics, 172 (Aug. 1995), 45-49. The story title on the cover of the magazine reads "Enola Gay: From Glory to Dishonor. Our Shameful Treatment of The World's Most Famous Airplane."
1044
The Journal of American History December 1995 be reached more powerfully through the senses of sight and sound than through the intellectuality of words, the exhibit appealed to viewers' emotions, and its message could be read to be tendentious and moralizing; the exhibition script could be read to condemn American behavior at the end of World War I1.12 On the first panel of text at the entry to the exhibition, in the second sentence mentioning the atomic bomb, visitors would learn that "To this day, controversy has raged about whether dropping this weapon on Japan was necessary to end the war quickly." 13 Nearly every section of the exhibit that followed would contribute, directly or by juxtaposition, to doubts not only about the necessity and appropriateness of the bomb but about American motives, honor, decency, and moral integrity in wreaking such destruction on what the script portrayed as a defeated (but not surrendering) enemy.
The first of the five sections, "A Fight to the Finish," characterized combat in the Pacific as a bitter contest of racial hatreds that by 1945 had escalated to unprecedented ferocity; thus it implied that racism was an important impulse for using the atomic bombs. The script seemed sympathetic to both sides, but it contained an inherent imbalance of sympathies: The Japanese fought out of fear "that unconditional surrender would mean the annihilation of their culture," the Americans out of vengeance, although "the suicidal resistance of the Japanese military justified the harshest possible measures." The next section treated the kamikazes with sensitivity and sadness. What followed detailed the vast destruction wrought by the B-29 fire bombing ofJapanese cities; condemned strategic bombing by saying that "during World War II civilians themselves had become the target"; equivalently quoted Franklin D. Roosevelt, Adolf Hitler, and Neville Chamberlain in 1939 eschewing the bombing of civilians, and a few pages later George C. Marshall threatening the fire bombing of Japanese civilians in November 1941; and generally sympathized with the Japanese victims of the 1945 bombing campaign. The comparison between the American and Japanese home fronts-one description emphasizing dedication, unity of purpose, material production, and prosperity (and mentioning the internment of Japanese Americans), the other focusing on increasing deprivation and suffering ("on the brink of collapse")-completed the contrast and could be read to swing the weight of sympathy clearly to the Japanese side. 14 The second section, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," offered in its concluding analyses consensus interpretations that avoided criticizing the American action.
But the text also took every opportunity to pose alternatives and raise doubts. Viewers of the exhibition could not help but walk away believing, as the planning document promised, that a different outcome was possible and preferable. The titles of some subsections indicated a line of interpretation that visitors could read as skeptical of the necessity of using the bomb: "Deciding to Build the Bomb," 16 pages "The Most Terrible Weapon Ever Known in Human History," 5 pages 'Japan Looks for a Way Out of the War," 6 pages "The Soviet Factor," 7 pages "Selecting the Target," 10 pages "The Invasion of Japan: A Giant Okinawa?" 6 pages "Truman, Stalin, Potsdam and the Bomb," 10 pages It is nonetheless possible to assert, at least in hindsight, that the United States should have paid closer attention to these signals from Japan. Like so many aspects of the 'decision to drop the bomb,' this matter will remain forever speculative and controversial.
It is possible that there was a lost opportunity to end the war without either atomic bombings or an invasion of Japan.
Some combination of blockade, firebombing, an Emperor guarantee, and a Soviet declaration of war would probably have forced a Japanese surrender, but to President Truman an invasion appeared to be a real possibility. Matters were not as clear in 1945 as they are in hindsight, because Truman and his advisers could not know how the war would actually end.
It is . . . clear that there were alternatives to both an invasion and dropping atomic bombs without warning-for example guaranteeing the Emperor's position, staging a demonstration of the bomb's power, or waiting for blockade, firebombing and a Soviet declaration of war to take their toll on Japan. Since these alternatives are clearer in hindsight and it is speculative whether they 1046
The Journal of American History December 1995 would have induced the Japanese government to surrender quickly, the debate over 'the decision to drop the bomb' will remain forever controversial.'5
The third and longest section, "Delivering the Bomb," celebrated American technological and operational ingenuity and the bravery of the American aviators. The texts and the subsection titles, however, were admiring but matter-of-fact, especially in comparison with the sections before and after:
"The B-29: A Three-Billion Dollar Gamble," 9 pages "The B-29 and the Bombing of Japan," 17 pages "The World's First Atomic Strike Force," 27 pages "The B-29 Superfortress 'Enola Gay,"' 6 pages "The Missions," 27 pages Sandwiched between a long section questioning the use of the bomb and the fourth unit depicting what happened when the bombs killed tens of thousands of Japanese civilians, this careful, laudatory reconstruction of airplanes and fliers might have had very little emotional impact. And once visitors moved on to the next viewing area, they would confront scenes that made any impulse to memorialization utterly inappropriate.
Unit four possessed no ambivalence whatsoever. "When visitors go from Unit 3 to Unit 4," predicted the 1993 planning document, "they will be immediately hit by a drastic change of mood and perspective: from well-lit and airy to gloomy and oppressive. The aim will be to put visitors on the ground during the atomic bombings of the two cities." "Ground Zero: Hiroshima, 8:15 A.M., August 6, 1945 [;] Nagasaki, 11:02 A.M., August 9, 1945" was designed to shock. "If Unit 2 [the decision to drop the bomb] is the intellectual heart of the exhibit, Unit 4 is its emotional center. Photos of victims, enlarged to life-size, stare out at the visitor. . . . The emphasis will be on the personal tragedy of this experience." 16 The four parts -"Before the Bomb: Two Cities at War" (9 pages), "The Incredible Avalanche of Light" (9 pages), "Two Cities in Chaos" (22 pages), and "A Deadly New Threat: Radioactivity" (19 pages) -were horrifying. Relentlessly, repetitively, redundantly, in excruciating detail, returning again and again to the death and mutilation of women and children, this section of the exhibit succeeded even in text form in eliciting shock and disgust. The many pictures of human pain and suffering, the heartrending quotations from observers and victims, all appealed to the emotions of viewers. Such scenes not only could reinforce anxieties about whether the United States needed to use the bomb but could provoke feelings of guilt and shame among American visitors, including veterans. In the ensuing controversy, no part of the exhibit angered veterans more.17 1I Ibid., 200, pp. 28, 31, 56, 66. 16 National Air and Space Museum, "Exhibition Planning Document, July 1993," p. Sept. 2, 1994, pp. 1, 7; and Miami Herald, Feb. 23, 1995, p. 13A . The author of the last article, Kate Cannon, the daughter of The final section finished the job. In a short 24 pages (some introductory), "The Legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" told two stories: 'Japan Surrenders" (8 pages) and "The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race" (14 pages).
For Japan, the United States, and its Allies, a horrific war was brought to an ubrupt [sic] end, although at a cost debated to this day; for the world, a nuclear arms race unfolded that still threatens unimaginable devastation. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be said to have simply caused either the end of the war or the nuclear arms race, but they have exercised a profound influence as military and political acts, as symbols of the arrival of the nuclear age, and as a glimpse of the realities of nuclear war.
Although the first subsection concluded that "the surrender ofJapan was doubtlessly a critical legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki," that statement grudgingly followed 162 words focusing once again on the controversy over whether the bombs were needed to shock Japan into surrender, whether the United States should have moderated its demand for unconditional surrender, and whether the Soviet intervention was equally responsible for the surrender. The 14 pages devoted to the Cold War depicted the nuclear arms race ("A World Gone 'M.A.D."') in starkly simplistic terms; an entire page examined the 1954 nuclear test accident that killed one crewman and sickened others on the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragonemphasizing once more the personal, human tragedy of atomic and nuclear power. 18 Read in this fashion with the probable reaction of visitors imagined, the entire exhibition cast a wholly negative interpretation on the development, use, and impact of the atomic bombs. It was thus possible, looking beyond the careful wording of each individual panel or label, to detect in the five sections of the exhibit an interpretation that was in today's parlance revisionist, countercultural, and condemnatory of the United States: the war was a racist conflict waged by Americans for vengeance, a war essentially won by mid-1945; the bombing was an unnecessary act, growing out of bureaucratic, diplomatic, and political as well as military impulses, that wreaked an atrocity upon a defeatedJapanese population. The bombing made an uncertain contribution to ending the conflict but an unquestionable one to a more dangerous, depressing world that still troubles us today.
To be fair to the curators, few readers saw such extremes in the first draft or voiced strong objections, at least before the controversy over the script burst into public view. The exhibit followed recent innovations in the museological community: to explore the broad contexts of important events, particularly their human dimensions; to include complexity; to stimulate viewer interest and evoke controversy; to educate as well as to commemorate; and to combine the best recent scholarship with artifacts and other materials in multimedia, interactive "shows" a 509th veteran, teaches at the University of Miami and Florida Atlantic University and is finishing an American history Ph.D., doing a "good bit of research . . . on World War II veterans." She wrote that "The American Legion's accusations that the exhibit made Americans look like 'butchers' and 'aggressors' . . . worked," inducing "some veterans" at the last 509th reunion to make "hysterical charges about the exhibit." ibid.
18 National Air and Space Museum, "Crossroads," 500, pp. 1, 15, 18.
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The Journal of American History December 1995 that draw in audiences in powerful ways, intellectually and emotionally.'9 The exhibit contained a balance of techniques and approaches. The first section, on 1945, provided context, and it was strongly interpretative. The second, on the decision to use the bomb, emphasized recent historical scholarship. The thirdon the bomb, the airplanes, and the mission-memorialized American science, technology, industry, and fighting men. The fourth roused powerful emotions in viewers, while memorializing people the museum perceived as among the major stakeholders, the Japanese. The fifth, on Japan's surrender and the nuclear age, explored implications and meanings. If the story featured civilian death, a case could be made that the most enduring significance of strategic bombing and of the atomic bombs, perhaps even of World War II, was to spread destruction to civilian populations in ways and with results heretofore unknown in the history of war.20 Knowing that the exhibit was meant to provoke and that it addressed hot-button issues, the museum administration consulted a distinguished group of scholars, balanced to include a range of expertise and experience. The museum's leaders emerged from the meeting with this Exhibit Advisory Committee in February 1994 believing that the product was sound and that the necessary modifications were not major. Apparently the discussion at that meeting and the written critiques that grew out of it did not give sufficient warning about the imbalances in the script to prepare the museum for what followed. Military historians who scrutinized the script later would flag the problems, of detail and conception, and criticize the script in much stronger terms, a few questioning its scholarship and interpretations as well as its balance. But by then it was too late.2" May 18, 1995, pp. 72-78, 89-90, 92-93, 95-98 . See also, "Excerpts from Hearings of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration," Journal ofAmerican History, 82 (Dec. 1995), 1136-44. As late as August 1994, Harwit expressed his goals for the exhibition as both a commemoration of the veterans' contributions and "an accurate portrayal that conveys the reality of atomic war and its consequences." Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1994, p. C9. 21 For the meeting and its immediate aftermath, I have relied on Goldberg, "Smithsonian Suffers Legionnaires' Disease," 29-30; and on conversations over the last year with Martin Harwit, Tom Crouch, Edward Linenthal, and Herman Wolk. I have seen in its entirety only one written critique from the February meeting that was filed before the Air Force Association attacked the exhibit publicly: [Herman Wolk], "Comments on Script, 'The Crossroads . . . ,"' [Feb. 1994] (in Kohn's possession). Excerpts from other comments are printed in Tom Crouch's statement in Committee on Rules and Administration, Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the Future, 77. My own views of the first and fourth scripts were communicated in Kohn to Harwit, June 18, Sept. 19, 26, 1994 , Jan. 31, 1995 The second story was the reaction of the Air Force Association and its public attack on the exhibition, undertaken either to force a revision or to stop it altogether. The association, formed immediately after World War II by Army Air Forces veterans to promote air power and the air force, had evolved over two generations into a large, powerful advocate for a strong national defense and a chief connecting link between the air force and its industrial suppliers. A private organization with an elected leadership and professional staff, it is separate from the United States Air Force, although the association's membership includes many active-duty and reserve servicemen and -women and many veterans, overwhelmingly of the air forces, of World War II and the Cold War. Some of the association's Washington staff had come to view Smithsonian in general and NASM in particular with suspicion; the exhibit script confirmed their worst fears. This was the fourth planning document for the Enola Gay exhibition that they had seen. They had detected hidden political messages in all those documents. Especially offensive to people who viewed their organization as representing tens of thousands of Army Air Forces veterans of World War II, living and dead, were the hints of doubt about the ethics and morality of the way the United States fought Japan and, by implication, about the honor of those who did the fighting. From the association's perspective, this "emotionally charged program," which "was fundamentally lacking in balance and context," was all the more suspect because the museum had been assuring veterans for years that the exhibition would honor their service.22 Association staff members believed their objections were disregarded, although NASM officials believed they were consulting and listening (if not exactly responding) to a primary stakeholder and an important potential opponent. Having shared its plans, the museum leadership was therefore shocked when Air Force Magazine published, in April 1994, a virulent attack on the exhibit script, the curators, the director, and the museum, less than two months after the Exhibit Advisory Committee had seemingly approved the script.23 23 The first public attack was issued as a documented "Air Force Association Special Report" titled "The Smithsonian and the Enola Gay" and published as Correll, "War Stories at Air and Space." Six months earlier, the association's executive director had written Harwit that "the new concept does not relieve my earlier concerns and, in some respects, it seems even less balanced . . . than the earlier concepts were. . . . you assure me that the exhibition will 'honor the bravery of the veterans,' but that theme is virtually nonexistent in the proposal as drafted." The plan "dwells, to the effective exclusion of all else, on the horrors of war"; the "concept paper treatsJapan and United States in the war as if their participation in the war were morally equivalent. If anything, incredibly, it gives the benefit of opinion to Japan, which was the aggressor." "Balance is owed to all Americans, particularly those who come to the exhibition to learn. What they will get from the program as described is not history or fact but a partisan interpretation." Monroe W. Hatch Jr. to Harwit, Sept. 10, 1993 (in Kohn's possession). In 1.993, at the request of the museum, I discussed the proposed exhibit with General Hatch, with whom and for whom I had worked in the 1980s when he was inspector general of the air force, vice commander in chief of Strategic Air Command, and vice chief of staff of the air force. (In 1988, when he was my supervisor's boss, I had shared concerns about the exhibit with him.) While both General Hatch and I recognized the broader purposes and activities of the association, the general was emphatic in saying that he "represented a veterans organization," which I interpreted as a statement by him of the association's primary reason for taking such intense interest in the Enola Gay exhibit. On the Air Force Association, see James H. Straubel, Crusade for Airpower: The Story of the Air Force Association (Washington, 1982) ; and Wallace, "The Battle of the Enola Gay," 10-11. The violence of the Air Force Association's public assault -the personal attacks on Smithsonian secretary Robert Adams and Air and Space director Martin Harwit, the accusation that the museum had been neglecting its primary task of preserving its priceless artifacts, the charges of political correctness -indicated something deeper at work.24 Just as that first script cannot be understood apart from the museum's history of the previous ten years, so the Air Force Association's public blast, which brought the controversy over the exhibit to the nation's attention, cannot be understood apart from the unhappiness with the museum felt by some in the air force community. They believed that Smithsonian as a whole and Air and Space curators in particular were antimilitary, that displays downplayed military as opposed to commercial or general aviation, that the museum sometimes took a skeptical or disparaging attitude toward aviation, flight, air power, space exploration, even science and technology per se. Such perceptions were all the more irritating because Army Air Forces chief Hap Arnold had been instrumental in founding the museum and had donated many aircraft (including the Enola Gay) to the Smithsonian, and Sen. Barry Goldwater, a pilot in World War II and a
The Journal of American History December 1995 general in the air force reserve, had provided the final push to get the museum built, citing the need to celebrate aviation's achievements. A permanent exhibition on air power in World War I, which opened at the museum in 1991, drew special ire, not only because it emphasized the carnage of the war, the airplane as an instrument of death, and the invalidity of popular myths about "knights of the air" but also because the exhibit relegated the airplanes to a secondary role, hanging them from the ceiling virtually out of sight. The exhibit labeled the effect of aviation in that war both limited and a failure. Most infuriating, that exhibit ended with a video on strategic bombing in the seventy-plus years after World War I, including the atomic bombing and controversially high estimates of Iraqi casualties in the Gulf War, all of which air force people interpreted as biased, gratuitous, and indicative of the anti-air power attitudes pervading the museum. The aspirations of the aviation community for the museum were revealed in the association's inaugural blast at the exhibition, in the caption to the fullpage illustration opposite the first page: "To aviation enthusiasts, the National Air and Space Museum is a special place, where priceless artifacts are held in trust, to be displayed with understanding and pride."25 A further problem lay in the lack of public monuments or national memorials to air power and the air force in Washington, in comparison with the army, navy, and marines. There may have been a subtle resentment that the most public reminder of aviation's contribution to American life and the nation's security was left by default to the Smithsonian. The marines have the Iwo Jima Memorial across the Potomac River in Arlington; the navy's is on Pennsylvania Avenue halfway between the White House and the Capitol. Both those services have national museums in the Washington Navy Yard, with historic residences for their ranking officers nearby. (The air force's national museum is at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.) The army lacks a national museum in Washington, but statues of famous generals dot the Washington landscape, which also includes Civil War fortifications, Arlington National Cemetery with its tomb of the unknown soldier, and many other reminders of army history. Even the merchant seamen of World War II have a memorial, near the Pentagon along the George Washington Parkway. The air force began only recently to raise money and seek a site for an air force memorial in the nation's capital.26
Nor can air battles be commemorated like those on land or sea by setting aside battlefields or large vessels, which become sacred ground (and decks) where people can walk, visualizing a two-dimensional clash of arms that moved in relatively slow, understandable terms. Air battles have been sudden, confusing three-dimensional melees difficult to depict adequately even in videos. Historically, air power has been memorialized almost exclusively by means of the machines themselves, displayed alone with labels describing what they did or what they represent. The more famous the aircraft, the more symbolic an emblem to be venerated, not only for the aviators who risked their lives, but for all who contributed to creating and supporting the machines in the sky.27 For the military aviation community, the Enola Gay was an icon. Perhaps from the beginning some wanted to abort any exhibition beyond the display of that icon, perhaps with some brief celebration of the achievements of the crew, the designers, and the builders, the American war effort, and the contribution of the Army Air Forces to victory in the war. It may well be, as one historian has charged, that the association's campaign "was designed, in part, to embarrass the Smithsonian and force the resignation of Harwit" so the museum would revert to a "strictly celebratory" orientation.28
In other words, the willingness of the Air Force Association to initiate and lead a public campaign against the exhibit must be understood within two contexts beyond the content of the exhibit: resentment of the National Air and Space Museum and the churning culture war that surfaced during the 1980s and rose to crescendo in 1994.
That culture war is the third element that helps explain the calamity of the Enola Gay controversy. The Air Force Association's attack of April 1994 landed like a match on dry tinder. There exploded over the summer and fall of 1994, among veterans' groups and in the speeches of politicians, a rising chorus of criticism, almost all of it directed at the museum, and from the liberal press and columnists as well as conservatives. Much of the outcry was almost certainly spontaneous, but the Air Force Association and veterans' groups did much to plan and manage the public criticism. "Changing the exhibit was no small task," according to one reporter in Air Force Times. "It took 18 months of relentless effort from dozens of groups, especially the Air Force Association and the American Legion, which mobilized their members to pressure Capitol Hill lawmakers to stop the exhibit. "s 29 Historians and other scholars will need to locate the Enola Gay exhibit battle in the wider culture wars, but from the initial attack by Air Force Magazine to the postmortems after the exhibit was canceled, those involved in the battle 27 My thinking derives from Edward Tabor Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields (Urbana, 1993) . 28 Correll, "'Last Act' at Air and Space," 64; Vago Muradian, "'This Is What We Wanted': How a Veteran's Letter Launched a Campaign to Honor the Enola Gay," Air Force Times, Feb. 13, 1995, p. 17; Goldberg, "Smithsonian Suffers Legionnaire's Disease," 33. In his statement to the Senate, on May 11, 1995, R. E. Smith, national president of the Air Force Association, stated: "The question does not end with the Enola Gay exhibit. What about the next exhibit and the one after that? We would like to see the museum putting its main effort on its primary mission which is to collect, preserve, and display historic aircraft, spacecraft, and aeronautical artifacts. There are most certainly indications of change; the main one being the resignation of the director. ... It was unfortunate that matters came to that, but it was probably inevitable." Committee on Rules and Administration, Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the Future, 29.
29 For a sampling of reaction and analysis of the public campaign, see St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 9, 1995, p. 1; "Atom Bomb Exhibit Hit," Council on America's Military Past, Headquarters Heliogram (July-Aug. 1994), 1, 8; WVashington Post, Aug. 14, 1994, p. C8; Boston Globe, Aug. 16, 1994, p. 5; WVall StreetJournal, Aug. 29, 1994 , p. A10; Charles Krauthammer, "An Exhibit Infused with Revisionism on Hiroshima Bomb," Chicago Tribune, Aug. 19, 1994, p. 13; ibid., Sept. 2, 1994, pp. 1, 6 ; Lance Morrow, "Essay: Hiroshima and the Time Machine," Time, Sept. 19, 1994, p. 94; WVashington Times, Dec. 21, 1994, p. 6; A. J. Bacevich, "Rewriting 'The Last Act,"' WVorld and I, 9 (Dec. 1994), 78-83; Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 26, 1995, p. 21; and Raleigh News and Observer, Feb. 2, 1995, p. 9A. Muradian, "'This Is What We Wanted,"' 17. For an analysis of the press coverage of the controversy, see Tony Capaccio and Uday Mohan, "Missing the Target," American journalism Review, 17 (July/Aug. 1995), 18-26.
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The Journal of American History December 1995 connected the exhibition and the argument over it to the campaigns over political correctness, provocative art, multiculturalism, equal opportunity programs, gender and sexual orientation, the national history standards and revisionist history, and just about every other divisive social and cultural issue rending American society, save abortion and prayer in the schools.30 "What can't be altered," opined the Wall Street Journal, "is the clear impression given by the Smithsonian that the American museum whose business it is to tell the nation's story is now in the hands of academics unable to view American history as anything other than a woeful catalog of crimes and aggressions against the helpless peoples of the earth." 3'
The museum responded in a number of ways. Harwit, in a letter to Air Force Magazine and in short essays, appealed to verifiable history and to recent scholarship, acknowledging the differing views of the function of the museum and the differing perspectives of the World War II and Cold War generations on the atomic bombings.32 During the spring and summer of 1994, museum officials also undertook to defuse the criticism by changing the exhibit. Harwit gave the script another careful reading to judge balance, and he found "much of the criticism . . .understandable."33 Having circulated the draft script with the intention of consulting widely, listening to responses, and altering the exhibit where appropriate, the museum changed the script, making use of criticism from Department of Defense historians and from a team inside the museum consisting chiefly of senior retired military aviators. The museum leadership also began to negotiate content with groups outside the museum with political agendas and no claim to scholarly knowledge, museum expertise, or a balanced perspective. Museums customarily consult, consider, react, and modify their products according to the best advice they can gather, but to negotiate a rendering of the past in exchange for acquiescence poses special dangers.34 To negotiate an exhibition on the labor movement in American history with the American Federation of Labor-Congress 30 A particularly incendiary example was George F. Will, "Score Big Points: Kill the Monster at Smithsonian," Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 26, 1995, p. 21 . Otis Graham connected the controversy over a proposed Disney history park with the Enola Gay exhibit battle, arguments in the Santa Barbara high schools over ethnic studies, and debate over the National History Standards. See Otis Graham, "Editor's Corner: Who Owns American History?," Public Historian, 17 (Spring 1995), 8-11. See also Karen J. Winkler, "Who Owns History?," Chronicle of Higher Education, Jan. 20, 1995, pp. A10-11, A18; Wallace, "Battle of the Enola Gay," 6-8. 3' Woall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 1994, p. A10; Uoashington Post, Feb. 11, 1995, p. 21. An editorial in the leading newspaper in the city where the American Legion has its headquarters said, "Americans who love their country are increasingly disgusted with the carping of elitists dedicated to tearing down national morale, insulting national pride and debasing national achievements." The editorial called for firing Martin Harwit and canceling the exhibit. "This isn't the first instance of arrogant revisionism on the part of Smithsonian curators. And it isn't likely to be the last unless Congress intervenes forcefully." Indianapolis Star, Jan. 25, 1995, p. A12. 32 See Martin Harwit to editor, Air Force Magazine, 77 (May 1994), 4; Raleigh News and Observer, Aug. 12, 1994, p. 21A; and "Enola Gay and a Nation's Memories," Air & Space, 9 (Aug./Sept. 1994), 18-21.
33 Martin Harwit, "Comments on Crossroads," April 16, 1994 (in Kohn's possession). This memorandum became public almost immediately. See Correll, "Three Doctors," 8, 9-10. 3 For the role of the veterans' organizations, see Committee on Rules and Administration, Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the Future, . This process apparently began in July. See ibid., 14. On "negotiation" with outside groups, see Edward T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum (New York, 1995) ; Daniel Martinez, remarks, "Enola Gay Exhibit" panel, "Presenting History"; and Barbara Franco, "Doing History in Public: Balancing Historical Fact with Public Meaning," Perspectives: Newsletter of the American Historical Association, 33 (May/June 1995), 5-8.
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) or one on medicine with the American Medical Association risks making the exhibition hostage to a constituent group that then wields a veto over fact or interpretation. That was exactly what happened to the Air and Space Museum during the last six months of 1994.35
By the end of October, after line-by-line review with the American Legion (a participation some veterans' groups refused), the script had been revised to a fifth version. Harwit, who oversaw the negotiations and ordered the changes, became trapped between curators who resisted alterations and the veterans' groups, some of them perhaps bent on getting the exhibit canceled. In August 1994, he expressed surprise at how little the exhibit had been altered, a complaint some historians were making and something the veterans' groups feared openly.36 Yet two months later there had been enough changes to provoke several dozen historians and writers to protest to the Smithsonian secretary that the museum had caved in to censorship and succumbed to "intellectual corruption," and that the fifth draft was "mere propaganda," the result of "historical cleansing." One author attacked the museum for abandoning "history with all its uncomfortable complications" in favor of "feel-good national myths."37
Thus by the fall of 1994, the museum had not succeeded in satisfying the veterans and had alienated many historians; its actions had called into question the credibility of the exhibition's scholarship. Harwit had lost the trust of both groups. Mired in a senseless contest over the number of casualties expected in the planned invasion of Japan-a symbol of whether the bombing was necessarythe museum had become the target of a United States Senate resolution demanding history in proper context and exhibits reflecting positively on veterans of the Pacific war; the Smithsonian faced a troubling number of critics and politicians calling for Harwit's resignation or removal and the abandonment of the exhibition as planned. Not until too late did the museum leadership realize that the exhibit could be canceled from the outside.38
The fourth and fifth elements came together after November 1994 with a speed and power that decided the outcome. First came the largely unexpected victory of the Republicans in the fall congressional elections. For those in the House of Representatives who had made the culture war central to their critique of American society, canceling this exhibit seemed a necessary victory, and one essential to rolling back the cultural Left in American intellectual life. After the exhibit was canceled, newly installed House Speaker Newt Gingrich told the nation's state governors that the "Enola Gay fight was a fight, in effect, over the reassertion by most Americans that they're sick and tired of being told by some cultural elite that they ought to be ashamed of their country."39 As part of the larger battle over American values, the Enola Gay exhibit seemed to its critics more emotional, significant, and less ambiguous than the debate over the National History Standards, the National Endowment for the Humanites and the National Endowment for the Arts, the Public Broadcasting Corporation, and the suspected left bias of the press and other institutions. If an exhibition that appeared to be openly unpatriotic, planned by a national, publicly funded museum on the fiftieth anniversary of the winning of World War II, could not be shut down or altered, then fashions and institutions more insulated from the levers of power might be truly unreachable. No matter that forcing the cancellation might excite charges of political censorship or the suppression of free speech, open debate, or the search for truth, values the critics professed; stopping the Enola Gay exhibition or converting it into a patriotic celebration would have deterrent and collateral effects. The threat of large cuts in the Smithsonian budget and hearings into how the Smithsonian was managed and administered were just the weapons to wield.
The final element in the story was a new Smithsonian secretary, brought in to raise money, who was unable or unwilling even to contest the political pressure to cancel the exhibition. And that pressure was intense. ByJanuary 1995, eighty-one members of Congress had called for firing Harwit; twenty thousand subscribers to Smithsonian magazine had complained about the exhibit. Some 72 percent of the Smithsonian's operating budget and 77 percent of construction monies came from federal appropriations; the percentage of federal support had been rising as dollars from the private sector dwindled. In the middle of January 1995, the American Legion, using as an excuse Harwit's intention to change a casualty estimate for the invasion ofJapan, suddenly demanded cancellation of the exhibition, called on Congress to help, demanded hearings into Smithsonian's management, and asked that the Enola Gay be transferred to another museum for display in a positive context. The secretary met with legion officials onJanuary 18 and refused; thirteen days later he reversed himself and abandoned the exhibition.40
In the weeks before becoming Smithsonian secretary, I. Michael Heyman, a law professor and former chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, had defended "the independence of the Institution from detailed political direction." Heyman was "especially sympathetic" to the analogy between "the Smithsonian . . . [and] a public university"; the "threat to the Smithsonian budget [was like] . . . an attempt to dictate the books and curriculum to be taught in university courses." Heyman endorsed the idea that the "strength of America is the relative independence of its scholars from political pressures." But by November he had distanced himself from the exhibition. In a carefully reasoned and precisely worded speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, the new secretary defended the Smithsonian's educational role, the broadening of its museums to include "the full range of communities which share the American experience," the need for "context and interpretation" in exhibits, and the propriety of controversial exhibits, even ones that "transform the visitors' perspective." He denied that "the Smithsonian's role" in "presenting American history [was] . . . solely to affirm 'good news' and traditional patriotic values." He argued that "it is possible to respect affirmation without only telling the good news of history." Although Air and Space's "goal was honorable and important: to provide a context in which to understand the significance" of the airplane's "participation in that epic moment," the exhibit had presented only "half a context." Heyman believed the exhibit needed "to honor the heroism of the American forces in their war against clear Japanese aggression and to recognize that significant numbers of American lives were saved" while respecting "the pain of those affected by the bomb on the ground and the precedent of the use of the bomb in a war." "If we are to capture our audiences' attention and carry out our mission as a national educational institution, we must eschew presenting narrow viewpoints. We must explore and present the complexities of our subjects, including the curator's 'take,' and we must be mindful that most in our audiences are perfectly willing to deal with new ideas and interpretations (not always, of course, agreeing with them) if they do not feel that their own are despised. 30, 1994 30, (Washington, 1994 , 83-100. The American Legion gave the impression that it withdrew its support for the exhibition because Harwit changed the estimate of potential American casualties in an invasion of Japan. In reality, that change was inconsequential from an interpretive standpoint, and American Legion leaders had already decided to oppose the exhibition before receiving Harwit's letter informing them of the change. See John T. Correll, "Political Exhibit Crashes at the Smithsonian," Air Force Magazine, 78 (March 1995), 12; "Invasion of Japan-At What Cost?," Jan. 18, 1995, revised label, fifth script (in Kohn's possession); and Thomas B. Allen and Normal Polmar, "Blown Away," WVashingtonian, 30 (Aug. 1995), 110. 41 I. Michael. Heyman, "Smithsonian Perspectives," Smithsonian, 25 (Oct. 1994 ), 9; I. Michael Heyman, "The Smithsonian: From the Spirit of St. Louis to Enola Gay," Nov. 10, 1994 (in Kohn's possession). In his "installation address," Sept. 19, 1994, Heyman "commented . . . that our first script was deficient." See Committee on Rules and Administration, Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the Future, 67. In a February 1995 speech to the National Press Club, Heyman said: "We need to distinguish between opinion and fact. We need to contribute to light rather than heat. And we need to avoid 'instructing' people or telling them how to think." Yet "there should always be room at the Smithsonian to explore important contemporary issues lest our great potentialities as an educational institution be wasted" (in Kohn's possession).
1058
Eighty-one days later, when Heyman canceled the exhibit, he had changed his mind about the feasibility of combining commemoration and history. His "one overriding reason" for cancellation was "that we made a basic error in attempting to couple an historical treatment of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th anniversary commemoration of the end of the war. " The "veterans and their families were expecting, and rightly so, that the nation would honor and commemorate their valor and sacrifice. They were not looking for analysis, and, frankly, we did not give enough thought to the intense feelings such an analysis would evoke." While the revisions of the script "succeeded in creating plans for a more balanced presentation . . . the problem was more than one of balance," and a "fundamental flaw in the concept of the exhibition" made "our sincere efforts to address everyone's concerns . . . bound to fail. No amount of re-balancing could change the confusing nature of the exhibition." Earlier Heyman had contended that a few "historical objects," such as Charles Lindbergh's aircraft The Spirit of St. Louis and "the actual Star Spangled Banner" that had inspired Francis Scott Key, had a "kind of power" to "speak for themselves"; now "the Enola Gay and its crew" had no choice.42
Before he abandoned the exhibition, Heyman had listened to Harwit argue against cancellation. Harwit warned that the decision would destroy the morale of curators and staff at his museum and throughout the institution and bring on Smithsonian the opprobrium of scholars across the country for buckling under political pressure; educational opportunities would be lost along with an excellent exhibit that had undergone four full revisions. Heyman and Undersecretary Constance Newman dismissed these arguments by weighing them against the threat of massive reductions in congressional appropriations and private contributions and the threat to the independence of the institution. The scholars, Newman and Heyman pointed out, were nowhere to be seen defending Smithsonian, and they would get over it. 4 Less than a month after abandoning the exhibition, Heyman went further, telling an audience at the National Press Club that Smithsonian had studied its future and would clearly need more money: to use technology "to take the Smithsonian into American homes and schools," to care for the 140 million objects it possessed, to collect, and to mount exhibitions. The institution, however, was "not buffered . . . from the influence of the purse or the suasion of congressional opinion." The "ground rules -not unlike those guiding state legislatures in relating to their public universities-" were that Smithsonian "is expected to make its own judgment concerning the nature of its programs." But "if new initiatives require Federal funding . . . the Congress rightfully determines whether to make such investments." The primacy of budget came out most clearly in the Senate hearings nearly four months later, when Ted Stevens, Republican 42 I. Michael Heyman to "All Smithsonian Employees," memo, Jan. 30, 1995 (in Kohn's possession); Heyman, "Smithsonian," ibid. In his testimony on May 18, 1995, Heyman stated that in January he had believed the exhibition possible, but that he changed his mind because of "renewed efforts to have the exhibition canceled." Committee on Rules and Administration, Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the Future, 68. 41 Harwit, conversation with Kohn, Feb. 2, 1995. of Alaska, chairman of the Rules and Administration Committee, told Heyman that "eroding public support threatens the ability of the Smithsonian to continue to be the central depository of our nation's artifacts." "I am worried, because we are going to discuss the budget for the next 5 years, and there is not room in that budget for the projection you have made to manage the institution you have. . . . I believe you should have the money," Stevens said -twice. "But I can tell you, you will not get it from this Congress if we have controversies like this. You cannot expect to have dramatic increases in funding at the time of controversies of this size."44 In January 1995, Heyman faced an awful choice. A new Republican Congress, promising major changes -and reductions -in the government, was organizing itself, about to hammer out a five-year budget agreement. Heyman, sixty-four years old, intended to stay in office only until he reached age seventy. A Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution, only the third such outside body commissioned by the regents in the 150 years sinceJames Smithson's bequest, had concluded that "even with the best imaginable outcomes, improvement in revenues and operating efficiencies will not resolve the financial issues facing the Smithsonian." To deal with these "daunting facts," "choices will have to be made," and the commission recommended many, some requiring more, not less, money.45
By canceling the exhibition, the new secretary would repudiate his most popular museum and admit management problems that might require him to impose authority over museums, galleries, research institutes, outreach efforts-institutions and programs that had been run for over a century loosely, like a major research university. The problem was not "curatorial freedom," for to Heyman, as he put it in his November San Francisco speech, "there are differences between a university and the museum world of the Smithsonian. Most people treat academic work as that of the professor's -either as author or in the context of presentation to a class or scholarly audience. Scholarly work, of comparable quality, translated into an exhibition in a museum, and in particular a national museum, however, is seen as an official statement and a national validation." The pressing problem was imposing from the top guidelines, standards, and policies that might be difficult to apply to diverse activities and that might undermine independence, creativity, and entrepreneurial spirit. In the summer of 1994, the vice president for research at Colonial Williamsburg had ridiculed interference by "nonacademic administrative officers and . . . trustees . . . to abrogate major program initiatives . . . or [to] downplay this or that kind of history" as a "tired old jab [that] lands few solid punches on museums today." Cancellation would constitute exactly such an intervention. As Heyman admitted in his Senate testimony, his willingness 1060 The Journal of American History December 1995 to consider top-down initiatives "with regard to exhibition policy and exhibition review is a little shocking to a number of my colleagues, and we are going to have an awful lot of conversation with respect to that." Heyman understood that his action would damage the Smithsonian's reputation, call into question its scholarly integrity, and give the appearance of political censorship. 46 When the controversy blew up all over again in mid-January just as Congress convened, he had to choose. To cite a conflict between commemoration and history, between celebration and scholarship, offered a cover, although at the hearings the veterans' organizations disputed that and lamented the abandonment of a substantive exhibition. The president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, a distinguished biochemist who chaired the commission on the Smithsonian's future, reportedly regretted the decision as "a political one . . . cowing to pressure . . . the kind of nightmare that Washington hands out to people who come here to do important jobs."47 But perhaps the Enola Gay exhibit was simply the last straw, following other exhibits denounced for disparaging American culture. As Heyman's predecessor, Robert Adams, had reflected the previous summer, "this may be a good time to be leaving." Michael Heyman was just coming in. By abandoning the exhibition and agreeing to review some earlier controversial exhibitions and to suspend or delay new ones underway, he chose to surrender the Smithsonian's independence in order to save it.48
History has had many functions in human society, the accurate reconstruction of the past being only one. "What happened, what we recall, what we recover, what we relate, are often sadly different," the scholar of the Middle East Bernard Lewis wrote twenty years ago. "The temptation is often overwhelmingly strong to tell it, not as it really was, but as we would wish it to have been." The conflict over the Enola Gay exhibition was in part generational, for to World War II veterans a critical presentation of this climactic event, on the Washington Mall during the fiftieth anniversary, seemed to discredit all that they had done in a cause that had defined their lives and connected them to American history. But Americans have frequently fought over how to commemorate anniversaries, design monuments, observe holidays, and mount displays and exhibitions. The United States government, like other national governments in the last two centuries, has used the memory of war to construct the identity and to build the cohesion of the modern nation-state. At the state and local levels, people have had different agendas. Throughout our history, the memorializations of battles and wars have been important cultural and political rituals that have had varied and changing meanings for individuals and groups -something all too easily forgotten as the fiftieth-anniversary commemorations of World War II come to a close. Because of its fame and mission, the Enola Gay, displayed alone or in an exhibit, in Washington fifty years after the event and in a heretofore celebratory museum, was sure to arouse passion.49
But the causes of the controversy and the cancellation lay in the diverse circumstances that came together in 1994: an exhibit designed to provoke its viewers with powerful (perhaps tendentious) interpretations; a difficult relationship between a museum and an important constituency; long-developing and increasingly bitter contests over education, social relationships, historical interpretations, public culture, and other issues rending American society; mistakes of process and response by the Air and Space Museum; a new, aggressive, determined Republican majority in the Congress; and a new, peculiarly vulnerable Smithsonian leader who did not resist pressures generated by an enormous national outcry. Before we read wider implications for presenting history in American society into this experience, we had better know and reflect on the events and conditions that help explain the event.
The historical and museum communities should be sensitive to the ironies as well as the issues. Some veterans' groups wanted a full historical exhibit; a few, including the Enola Gay pilot Paul Tibbets and the scholar and veteran Paul Fussell, from the beginning wanted no exhibit other than the airplane; others worked with the museum to the end, and at least one, the Retired Officers Association, sincerely deplored the cancellation.50 An exhibit that provided the context of the entire war, that explained in even tones the decision to drop the bomb from the American government's viewpoint (including the disagreements among historians over American motives), that memorialized the artifacts and the fliers as the original script did, that recounted the effect of the bombs on the ground without attempting to arouse emotion or to use repetition in a way that might appear moralizing, and that explored the implications of the bomb for the II, and a turning point in world history was lost.54 Certainly, the Enola Gay exhibition, even in its unbalanced versions, would have revealed the power and effectiveness of bombing and of nuclear weapons. Ironically, the effects for American foreign policy could have been salutary. Millions of people, including many of the world's leaders, would have seen how destructive nuclear bombs are and how difficult it is to control the passion unleashed in nations during wartime, perceptions that might help prevent nuclear proliferation and deter aggression. Viewers would have seen a reminder of what happens when an aggressor sets out on a war of conquest, attacks American interests, and provokes the American people. Placed just a few blocks from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and from the exhibit on the World War II internment of the West Coast Japanese Americans at the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History, the atomic bombing exhibit would have attracted many visitors. Those who saw all three might have reflected on the folly of racism and concluded that some wars are worth fighting, World War II being one of them.
